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The Body as an Alternative: Space for Utopia 
 
Francesca Borg Taylor-East 
 
University of Malta 
 
This essay starts with the query of whether the corporeal body may be viewed as an alternative 
space for utopia. I shall approach this through a phenomenological framework, considering the 
spatial aspect of the body specifically through the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Following 
this, I shall consider whether the body can be viewed as a sacred space through certain notions, 
as well as practices, of the body. In light of this, the initial question posed transforms as follows: 
can we consider the body as a sacred space, for example, through the acts of meditation and 
prayer? These considerations will lead to certain others: for instance, if the body can be seen as a 
sacred space, then is this space a private or public space? What are the implications of the body 
as a sacred space in a social sphere? If we are indeed able to view the body as a sacred space, this 
will lead to the consideration of the body as an alternative space for utopia.  
This essay shall also briefly tackle what is meant by “sacredness”. Here, I outline some 
definitions on sacredness before focusing on the work of the religious historian, Mircea Eliade, 
as well as that of the anthropologist Mary Douglas. I address what is meant by “utopia” through 
the work of Vincent Geoghenhan, who explores the topics of ideology and utopia. I conclude 
with whether these notions, the sacred and the utopian, can be synthesised through the corporeal 
body, making the body an alternative space for expressing or manifesting utopia, or traces 
thereof. 
 
The Phenomenology of the Body 
Before moving to the main argument at hand, I shall first justify the body as an inherently spatial 
entity, the body as being of space and not in it. The notion of the body’s spatiality is of present 
importance in that this argument approaches the corporeal body as being a sacred space itself, or 
at the least being spatial while taking on sacred aspects. In order to do this, I will begin by 
introducing Merleau-Ponty's notion of the perception of space.  
According to Merleau-Ponty, the traditional view of space—space as a container—is an 
experiential error. As David Morris notes, his notion of space is characterised as pre-existing and 
independent of our perception.1 Following this, the traditional philosophical view then questions 
how our depth-perception reconstitutes that already established space. Subsequently, space is 
viewed as entirely beyond the perceiver, and depth-perception is discussed almost as though it 
took place wholly within the perceiver. Of course, traditional philosophy felt the need to 
                                                 
1 See David Morris, The Sense Of Space (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 5-6, 10-11. 
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acknowledge that there is a crossing between body and world through the body perceiving depth 
within the world. Traditional analyses of space acknowledge a crossing but simultaneously sever 
it, either through predominantly viewing space as beyond the perceiver, as did George Berkeley 
through the given, or as predominantly putting emphasis on the perceiving subject as with 
Immanuel Kant’s categories. 
This leads us to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, which views our sense of space as arising from the 
intersection between the body and the world. Through this, the body is not self-contained and 
neither is the perceived world. Merleau-Ponty's aim is to show that this sense of space is 
fundamentally rooted within the crossing of body and world. It is perhaps useful to mention here 
that this shatters the subject-object division held within traditional philosophy on this point. 
Though we shall not be delving into this, it allows us to conceptualise this crossing of body and 
world in a clearer light. 
Here, I would like to continue in terms of Merleau-Ponty's body schema. Sens arises from the 
movement that crosses body and world; furthermore, this schema needs to be noted as both 
coming from movement and belonging to movement—it is dynamic. Morris notes that this is 
based in habit, and it ‘crosses over into the places in which we form habits, the places which we 
inhabit’.2 In a passage in the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty indeed notes that the 
theory of body schema is a theory of perception, and that the body schema serves as a bridge 
between the body and the perceived world. Furthermore, it can be said that the body schema 
communicates sens to both body and world.3 
In viewing space as arising from the dynamic crossing of body and world, we must also 
understand this crossing more deeply. As read by Morris, Merleau-Ponty shows that ‘[body] 
parts are not spread out side by side, but [are] enveloped in each other’.4 The zones of the body, 
therefore, must function together in unity. The word “zone” here captures the concept of 
movement distributed along the body and its prostheses. Enveloping does not occur only at the 
level of the body; the body’s zones envelop one another in perceptual movement. The body’s 
movement crosses with the world; thus, envelopment is not unique to the body, but is found in 
the movement that crosses body and world. Here, Morris uses the term “envelope” in a 
descriptive manner: 
Experience discloses beneath objective space, in which the body eventually takes up place, a 
primitive spatiality of which [objective space] is merely the outer envelope and which merges 
with the body's very being. To be a body is to be tied to a certain world, as we have seen; our 
body is not primarily in space: it is of it.5 
                                                 
2 For an elaboration of the specific points made thus far, see Morris, pp. 11, 5. Quoted: p. 33. 
3 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology Of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 206. 
4 Morris, pp. 114. 
5 ibid., pp. 118-9. 
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Continuing the phenomenological tradition, Edward Casey explores the intimate relationship 
between body and place. Knowledge of place begins with being-in-place.6 Casey follows 
Merleau-Ponty in the conception of the body being the first, where one’s own body is the 
necessary and the sufficient condition of being located here. Casey notes that this is what Husserl 
refers to as the “absolute here”. Furthermore, the living body has the capacity to regain 
orientation (after extreme situations of disorientation), or, at the very least, the body has the 
capacity to ‘integrate lostness with an ongoing situatedness’.7 
The scope of the above section is to illustrate an understanding of spatiality with specific 
consideration for the corporeal body. The most pertinent point in this section is specifically the 
spatiality of the body rather than a more traditional philosophical view: for instance, that of the 
body as inhabiting space, as though space were a container. In this sense, we have an 
understanding of the body as primarily spatial—it is of space itself. In doing this, now we can 
move on to the question of whether the spatiality of the body, its movements, and its relation to 
the world can take on the attribute of sacredness. Furthermore, we shall see whether this attribute 
of sacredness orients the body towards certain social ideals which contain traces of utopia.  
 
Sacredness of the body 
Can the body’s spatiality be acknowledged as a sacred space? Furthermore, why look at the body 
as a sacred space? The former question will be answered throughout this section of the paper. Let 
me first start, however, with the latter. As we have seen through the brief analysis of 
phenomenology above, our sense of space is derived from the crossing between body and world, 
and that we are of space. Furthermore, the body is the “absolute here” from which we stand in 
relation to the world. This next section aims to illustrate how the body takes on certain meanings 
and symbols, precisely due to bodily experience being a shared human experience. It is not only 
the point in which we can have a sense of space, but it is also the point through which we begin 
to grapple with structures, reproduce beliefs, manifest them, and relate them to others. We may 
retain the phenomenological sense of the body as the “first here” or “absolute here”, while also 
attributing it to the symbolism of the body as a way for human beings to grapple with the world. 
At the very least, we symbolise through the body as it is our first point of possible reproduction 
and manifestation of structures of the sacred, as well as the values that the sacred represents and 
the ideals that it maintains.  
In terms of “sacredness”, I shall here begin with an opening definition by Richard Jackson and 
Roger Henrie, which reads as follows: 
Sacred space is characterised by that portion of the earth’s surface which is recognised by 
individuals or groups as worthy of devotion, loyalty or esteem. Space is sharply discriminated 
                                                 
6 See Edward S. Casey, Getting Back Into Place (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 46-51. 
7 ibid., p. 51. 
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from the non-sacred or profane world around it. Sacred space does not exist naturally, but is 
assigned sanctity as man defines, limits and characterises it through his culture, experience and 
goals.8 
I argue that this definition may be extended towards the corporeal body. This notion of the 
sacred shall now be viewed through the lens of Mircea Eliade’s work, and, subsequently, the 
body’s symbolism through Mary Douglas’s work. I shall go on to show how the body becomes a 
symbol for society, and which may in turn take on the attribute of the sacred depending on the 
culture and its corresponding rituals; in becoming a symbol for society, we can begin to 
understand how the body represents the society’s values. Thus, the definition given by Jackson 
and Henrie may not only be extended, but made manifest through the body in its symbolism. An 
analysis of the sacred and the symbols of the body will allow us to understand the possibility of 
how, within social practices, the body is already directed towards utopian notions and social 
ideals.  
Mircea Eliade, a historian of religion, examines numerous concepts, such as the sacred and the 
profane, as well as religious sites and phenomena. Eliade’s work has been criticised for a number 
of reasons, amongst which is his appeal to mystical concepts. Eliade advocates notions such as 
“asceticism”, “absolute liberty”, “plentitude of life” and “harmony with the universe”.9 
Furthermore, as Tony Stigliano forwards, Eliade may be criticised on the basis of adopting and 
applying a construction of myth and mythology to sociopolitical issues. His mythological project 
would then become the basis for a Romanian fascist movement from 1919 to 1940.10 In The 
Hidden Intentions of Eliade, Yo-Han Yoo advocates that Eliade’s work should neither be 
completely defended nor rejected. While Eliade’s work should be challenged, and one must also 
criticise his method as it seeped into the sociopolitical realm, one should not disregard his work 
in relation to the deconstruction and interpretation of myth and religion. Eliade took on 
comparative studies in myth and religion from both Western and Eastern cultures, interpreting 
different paradigms in rituals, communities, and popular doctrines. Yoo notes how Eliade’s 
analysis of Western and Eastern cultures refuses to adopt the dominant West-centred 
perspective.11 Though Eliade’s work should be approached with caution, there is value in 
understanding the notions of the sacred and the profane through the lens of his work, especially 
since these notions are grounded in the analysis of culture, religion, myth, as well as historical 
significance. 
                                                 
8 Richard H. Jackson and Roger Henrie, ‘Perception Of Sacred Space’, Journal Of Cultural Geography, 3(2) (1983), 
94-107, p. 94. 
9 See, for instance, Wilhelm Danca, ‘The Origin of the Concept of Mysticism in the Thought of Mircea Eliade’. 
<http://www.academia.edu/11698172/The_Origin_of_the_Concept_of_Mysticism_in_the_Thought_of_Mircea_Elia
de> [accessed 11 May 2017]. 
10 See Tony Stigliano, ‘Mircea Eliade And The Politics Of Myth’, Revision, 24(3) (2002), 32-38, p. 32. 
11 Yo-han Yoo, ‘The Hidden Intentions Of Eliade? Re-Reading Critiques Of Eliade From The Perspective Of 
Eliade’s Expectation Of The History Of Religions’, Religion And Culture, 11 (2007), 223-244, p. 231.  
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Randall Studstill argues that Eliade’s work is threaded by a phenomenological approach, and he 
delves into this in some detail in his essay ‘Eliade, Phenomenology, and the Sacred’. Studstill 
examines Eliade’s interpretations of key concepts; in his words: 
[T]he structure Eliade considers fundamental—that which defines the religious as religious is the 
intentional relation between the believer and the sacred, where “sacred” is phenomenologically 
understood as that category of objects construed in the mind of the believer as both ultimately real 
and other with respect to the profane/material world.12 
Eliade views the religious phenomenon as “hierophany” which, in his work, is seen as any 
‘manifestation of the sacred’ which incorporates two elements: the ‘modality of the sacred’, and 
its expression in concrete historical phenomena. This ‘modality of the sacred’ is a 
phenomenological expression which refers to the structure of relation between the believer and 
the sacred. Relating to the history of the phenomena, the historical incident is a particularised 
history which underlies this entire structure of the believer, revealing some of the attitude that 
man holds toward the sacred. The history of hierophany outlines how the sacred was conceived 
and experienced. In approaching the religious as hierophany, Eliade focuses on the religious 
significance to the believer, either through conscious experience, belief or attitudes.13 He gives 
the example of a hierophany which was left behind by the history of a group of people: a Semitic 
cult which adored a divine couple: Ba’al, the god of hurricanes and fecundity, and Belit the 
goddess of fertility, especially of the earth. Jewish prophets viewed the belief, and the cult, as 
sacrilegious; the old Semitic cult of Ba’al and Belit, however, persisted in their adoration for the 
deities. The divine couple became the object of worship, symbolising religious values of life and 
the forces of sexuality, fertility and fecundity. Eliade estimates that adoration of the couple was 
maintained for hundreds if not thousands of years until another hierophany became dominant. 
Indeed, in his analysis of hierophanies, he notes that these may take on ‘universal value and 
significance, whereas others may remain local or of one period - they are not open to other 
cultures, and even fall eventually into oblivion even in the society which produced them’.14  
According to Eliade, the attitudes and beliefs of the experiencer, as well as the rituals and 
symbols of religion (such as artefacts, myths, texts, and so on), express particular ways of 
relating to and understanding the sacred. For Eliade, all the above encapsulates a religious way 
of being-in-the-world; any of these may express a ‘system’ or ‘structure of relation’. One of the 
most prominent examples, in fact, is the relation of the sacred to the real in the structure of 
relations. This is almost indistinguishable from the believer’s conscious attitude of the sacred as 
being real in an ultimate sense. Furthermore, a belief or artefact represents a method for relation 
with the sacred and is generally not self-consciously or explicitly represented in the phenomenon 
itself.15 
                                                 
12 Randall Studstill, ‘Eliade, Phenomenology, And The Sacred’, Religious Studies, 36(2) (2000), 177-194, p. 178. 
13 Mircea Eliade, Patterns In Comparative Religion (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 2-4.  
14 Patterns in Comparative Religion, pp. 3-4.  
15 See Studstill, pp. 178-180. 
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Since hierophany is rooted in history, Eliade demonstrates how the ‘understanding of a [religious 
phenomenon] will always come about in relation to history’.16 In the Latvian tradition, for 
example, the great goddess was Laima, seen as the goddess of destiny, presiding over marriage, 
birth, bountiful harvests, and the general well-being of animals. Being a goddess who presided 
over birth and destiny, Eliade notes how she would be an archaic religious figure, one that 
belonged to the early stages of Latvian paganism. However, there have also been disputes of 
Laima’s role in terms of historical alignments—Eliade cites Oskar Loortis, who argues that the 
figure of Laima would be too recent to be considered as an Indo-European divinity, and further 
notes her role as “goddess of destiny” as secondary.17 In ‘Zum Problem der Lettischen 
Schnicksalgöttinen’, Loortis argues that Laima was the secondary manifestation of the figure of 
the Virgin Mary in Latvian religious folklore. Given Loortis’s claim, Eliade goes on to note that 
it was more likely for the Virgin Mary to have substituted the ancient pagan divinities, borrowing 
traits from the Virgin mythos. Furthermore, aiding in the contradiction of Loortis’s claim, there 
is speculation that the notion of a divinity who protects one during childbirth is more archaic 
than that of destiny, and thus the argument that divinity came to rule both of these aspects is 
reformulated through having a longer history than Loortis claims.18 In looking at the historical 
traces, we can at least begin to understand the values that took precedence during that time 
period; moreover, we can see the influence of different cultures resulting in sharing and adapting 
certain attributes of their divinities.  
In this way, Eliade shows that the history of religion is very much about a devaluation and a 
revaluation process—that is, a history of what people have valued as sacred.  Furthermore, he 
goes on to outline that religion or religious experience is always rooted in historical context. 
While he does not go on to explore religious experience through its historical context, he does 
examine them as hierophanes, grounded in the religious domain. He argues that religious 
phenomenon are sui generis, which, in the view of other scholars, is an argument that proves 
definitely problematic since their approach of locating meaning is through the non-religious—
namely the cultural, the historical, the political, and so on. Studstill examines Eliade’s work with 
the example of prayer, seeing how, indeed, there may be non-religious aspects involved in this 
activity; however, according to Eliade, the activity of prayer is a distinct mode of experience and 
is consistently identifiable as such.  
We have already briefly seen Eliade’s understanding of the sacred, where ‘every religious act 
and every cult object aims at a meta-empirical reality [that is, the sacred]’; religious symbols (a 
medium of the sacred) ‘reveal reality’ or ‘a profound structure of the World’. Through this 
understanding, we can see religious symbols pointing towards a higher realm of reality or the 
divine—they strive toward a more profound image of the structure of the World and are 
                                                 
16 Patterns in Comparative Religion, p. 2.  
17 See Mircea Eliade, ‘History Of Religions And “Popular” Cultures’, History Of Religions, 20(1/2) (1980), 1-26.   
18 See Oskar Loortis, ‘Zum Problem der Lettischen Schnicksalgöttinen’, Zeitschrift Für Slavische Philogie, 26 
(1957), 78-103.  
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contrasted with the everyday. Studstill goes on to comment that, ‘[f]urthermore, this “divine 
personality” is not to be simply looked upon as a mere projection of human personality’.19  
Eliade claims that the sui generis aspect in the activity of prayer is present even if the objective 
towards which the prayer is directed does not exist. It is the act itself that is of interest, which has 
its own structure and its own set of qualities. Eliade does not deny that the cultural, historical and 
political realms are a part of the constitution of religious structures; in his view, religion does not 
occur in isolation from other domains. However, his argument pertains to religious experience 
constituting a unique domain, implying that it is superior to other domains of human life, arguing 
that the religious domain is that which explicitly shows the manifestation of the sacred. In this 
sense, as Yoo points out, he seems to rigidly combine the religious and the sacred, which causes 
him to proclaim one domain as superior over the rest.20 His reasoning is an existential one, 
arguing that religious structures of consciousness stem from the circumstances of being human. 
He argues that our existential predicament allows for “archetypal intuitions” to form and in turn 
they become expressed as religious forms. Eliade’s contention, then, is that the divine personality 
is not a mere projection or reflection of a human one and, in this sense, does not assert that the 
sacred is real, but, rather, that divinity is a manifestation of how believers come to terms with 
their humanness. This argument implies Eliade’s consideration of the religious worldview as 
existentially valuable.  
In looking at the religious domain as sui generis, Eliade is then criticised for an application of a 
religious and mythological project on the sociopolitical realm. One recalls how Stigliano argues 
that this extension of his decontextualised mystical thought of myth and religion over to the 
sociopolitical realm is a dangerous one in lending itself to fascist movements. However, Eliade 
should not be dismissed outright. In establishing a new field, he also creates a discourse and 
practice which resisted the method of instrumental rationality which dominated during that time 
period; indeed, even advocates of rationality should observe rationality’s limits. Though Eliade is 
heavily mystical in his work, which he is both praised and criticised for, he remains highly 
influential in comparative mythology and the history of religion.21  
Massimo Rosati’s article ‘The Archaic and Us’ offers three main criticisms, originally of Jürgen 
Habermas’s work on the sacred, but which can here also be attributed to Eliade: the ‘[r]efusal to 
fully recognize the normative dimension of the post-secular’, the ‘refusal to decouple the sacred’, 
and the ‘refusal to grasp the sacred as an unconscious dimension of modernity’.22 Both 
Habermas and Eliade, also directly acknowledged in Rosati’s work, tend to couple the sacred and 
the religious too rigidly; moreover, they do not make a clear distinction between a religious and a 
secular sacred. Rosati argues that this decoupling would aid the discussion on how the notion of 
                                                 
19 Studstill, pp. 181-2. 
20 See Yoo. 
21 See Stigliano, pp. 35-37. 
22 See Massimo Rosati, ‘The Archaic and Us: Ritual, Myth, the Sacred and Modernity’, Philosophy & Social 
Criticism, 40(4-5) (2014), 363-368. 
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the sacred and human rituals affect both the religious communities as well as secular identities 
for both the individual and the collective. In Rosati’s view, if we were to observe the sacred in 
both the religious and secular domains, the sacred appears without character. In this sense, the 
sacred is uncovered within its historical context and can be seen as ‘a condition of the possibility 
of society’.23 From this sociological point of view, the sacred is thus the outcome of human 
praxis, manifested through ritual action. It stems out of self-creation and self-representation 
which forms a part of our cognition, morality and judgements.  
Rosati does, however, seemsto agree with Eliade that the sacred, without claiming it an 
ontological structure, seems to be a ‘universal historical structure of human consciousness’.24 In 
this sense, one can understand Eliade’s approach to religion as an unmasking of the sacred in that 
domain, while also acknowledging that the sacred does not exist wholly within one domain, but 
appears throughout as a facet of humanity. It is here important to remember, as previously noted 
by Stagliano, that the rituals of one domain should not be overlapped or wholly applied to other 
domains, thus hindering us from viewing the sacred in other aspects of life. 
In attempting to view the body as a sacred space, the argument now turns to Mary Douglas’s 
work as elucidating the relationships between symbols, rituals and the body. In Purity and 
Danger, Douglas writes of how ‘[t]he body [...] provides a basic scheme for all symbolism. 
There is hardly any pollution which does not have some primary physiological reference. As life 
is in the body it cannot be rejected outright’.25 Here Douglas unmasks the symbolism of the body 
as being the root of both the sacred and the profane, or the pure and the polluted. In not being 
able to reject the body, and I argue that it is precisely due to it being the “absolute here”, we 
cannot but start from the position of our own corporeality. By trying to make sense of body and 
world, as well as their relationship, we are using our body as the starting point of this symbolism. 
The body has been pondered, disgraced, and upheld, allowing us to trace back an acute 
fascination with our own corporeality, as the following passage from Ovid demonstrates: 
But one more perfect and more sanctified, a being capable of lofty thought, intelligent to rule, 
was wanting still man was created! Did the Unknown God designing then a better world make 
man of seed divine? or did Prometheus take the new soil of earth (that still contained some godly 
element of Heaven’s Life) and use it to create the race of man; first mingling it with water of new 
streams; so that his new creation, upright man, was made in image of commanding Gods? On 
earth the brute creation bends its gaze, but man was given a lofty countenance and was 
commanded to behold the skies; and with an upright face may view the stars:—and so it was that 
shapeless clay put on the form of man till then unknown to earth.26  
Douglas outlines notions of the body as being a simultaneously private and social symbol during 
rituals, and takes on meaning in terms of sexuality for both the pure and polluted, including the 
                                                 
23 Rosati, pp. 365. 
24 ibid., pp. 365-6. 
25 Mary Douglas, Purity And Danger (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 165. 
26 Ovid, Metamorphoses, ed. by Aaron J Atsma, trans. by Brookes More. Book I, lines 76-88. 
<http://www.theoi.com/Text/OvidMetamorphoses1.html> [accessed 3 May 2017].  
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affirmation, as well as the wholeness, of the body. Within the next section, these concepts shall 
be discussed in some length, illustrated through examples. This shall allow us to view certain 
bodily symbols as sacred, while then giving us the basis to understand these symbols as orienting 
the body towards utopian ideals.  
In looking at symbolism in rituals, Douglas notes that ‘the more the symbol is drawn from the 
common fund of human experience, the more wise and certain its reception’. The human body is 
a complex structure with different functions, lending itself to being symbolic for other complex 
structures in being able to stand for any bounded system. In looking at human rituals, she argues 
that we must first be prepared to view the body as a symbol for society, which allows for an 
accrediting of the powers and dangers of the social structure to become manifest and reproduced 
in the human body; in her words, ‘what is being carved into human flesh is an image of 
society’.27 Body symbolism makes part of a common array of symbols precisely due to the 
emotive aspect of the individual’s experience.  
In looking at rituals related to the body, both themes of purity (or sacredness) and dirt (or 
pollution) can be found in its symbolism, but the same aspects of the body can be thought of very 
differently depending on the culture. In some cultures, for example, female menstruation is 
regarded as a lethal and feared danger, and in others not at all. Excreta is dangerous to some and 
a joke to others. In the Hebrew religion, blood is thought of as the source of life, but should not 
be touched except in the sacred conditions of sacrifice. Douglas notes how sometimes the spittle 
of a person in a powerful position was thought of as effective in blessings. In looking at the 
cultures and the rituals surrounding them, the body is found mirroring the social situation of 
belief structures; according to her, this symbolism leads back to the experience of the self with 
its body, allowing for insight into the self’s experience in society.28 In this sense, as we shall 
examine more closely in the penultimate section concerning utopia, if the society had ideals and 
utopian strives, these values can also manifest in bodily symbolism.  
In viewing rituals and symbols, the body takes up symbolism to reproduce both the sacred and 
profane, both of which can manifest simultaneously. We can even see instances of retaining the 
purity of the body for religious purposes, for instance through virginity, or self-control from the 
sinful nature of the body:  
Flee from sexual immorality. Every other sin a person commits is outside the body, but the 
sexually immoral person sins against his own body. [...]. You are not your own, for you were 
bought with a price. So glorify God in your body.29 
For this is the will of God, your sanctification: that you abstain from your sexual immorality; that 
each one of you know how to control his own body in holiness and honour, not in passion of lust 
like the Gentiles who do not know God.30 
                                                 
27 Douglas, pp. 115, 122. 
28 See ibid., pp. 121-2. 
29 I Corinthians. 6. 18. 
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The body as a symbol allows for the manifestation of both the sacred and profane, as well as 
different ways to reproduce these. In this way, the body can be thought of as an instrument for 
the sacred, to ‘glorify God in your body’, and as the sacred itself, as the object of devotion. 
Through the above examples, we can already see the symbolic aspect of the body as trying to 
retain social ideals and uphold what is important to a particular culture. For example, in the 
Sanskrit symbol of lingam (figure 1), a phallic symbol, the male and female genitalia are 
depicted alongside one another. This symbol is associated with male and female deities, usually 
as the forceful energy of the god Shiva alongside the yoni, the creative energy of Shakti—the 
female energy.31 It is seen as a representation of the origin or source and is thus associated with 
creation, the primal source of all being, represented by a triangle with its apex pointing 
downwards, symbolising the female sexual organ from which life originates. The lingam symbol 
depicts the indivisible two-in-oneness of the male and female relationship, representing sexual 
practices, meditative processes and a mental union between the sexes.32  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Image of the symbol lingam.  
 
The symbol lingam would represent the unity of the deities in their femininity and masculinity; 
the gods and goddesses were represented alongside one another. Furthermore, a god would 
always have a consort, a goddess, and vice versa. The gods are thus illustrated in dual form so 
that when one was invoked, the other was necessarily remembered. For example, the consort of 
Brahma, god of creation, is Sarasvati, the goddess of the ‘stream of speech’, rhetoric, wisdom, 
intuition and the divine word, also known as patron to the arts, especially music.33 Furthermore, 
it is understood that she is closely related to fertility and purification. The creation of the Sanskrit 
language, particularly its script which is known as the Devanagari script, is attributed to her and 
                                                                                                                                                             
30 I Thessalonians 4. 3-8. 
31 See Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary Of Hinduism (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 
351. 
32 See Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, Stephan Schuhmacher and Gert Woerner, The Encyclopedia Of Eastern Philosophy 
and Religion (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1989), pp. 313, 432. 
33 Fischer-Schreiber et al., p. 308. 
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Brahma. She holds the divine word unmanifest, whilst Brahma creates the Sanskrit symbols 
within reality.  
Lakshmi is the consort of Vishnu, the maintainer god, and in the Rig Veda her name is defined as 
“fortune”. In the Atharvaveda, she is looked to as the entity that brings fortune as well as 
misfortune, referring back to the notion of continuously maintaining balance. She is also seen as 
the goddess of surplus and happiness, as a symbol of beauty, and is often represented bearing a 
lotus blossom. Legend has it that she laid upon a lotus blossom upon creation. In another story, 
Lakshmi rose from the foam of the ocean, similar to Aphrodite in Greek mythology, another 
example of perfection. Upon birth, she becomes Vishnu's consort, and myth also has it that when 
the god and the goddess become incarnate, they are also united within their various forms of 
incarnation. For instance, when Vishnu was born as Parashu-Rama, she was his consort Dharani, 
and when he was born as Rama, she was Sita.34 The relationship persists even from one 
incarnation to another. Shiva, the destroyer god, is joined by Parvati as consort. In Pauranic 
mythology, Parvati is closely related to notions such as World Mother, known as shakti 
Jagadamata and with prakriti, or natural language. In a specific myth, she is depicted as having 
a playful character, innocently covering Shiva’s eyes. In order to prevent the whole of creation 
from being enveloped into darkness, a third eye appeared in the middle of Shiva’s forehead.35 
Through these diverse examples of divine couples, we can see the symbol of lingam having its 
roots within the divine and the mythological, wherein one deity is seen as inseparable from its 
counterpart and wherein the consorts complement one another. This takes on a corporeal 
representation in the symbol of lingam through male and female genitalia, proliferating the 
values of and what is important to that particular society; the symbol represents the ideals of that 
society and a utopian orientation of that society. In this case, these values are seen as the 
complementary aspects through the inseparable nature of the sexes.  
However, in trying to preserve the purity of the body in sexuality, as demonstrated above, there 
is also the possible fearing of the pollution of the body. In Hindu culture, for instance, female 
purity is carefully guarded, and those women who have sexual relations with a man of a lower 
caste are brutally punished in consequence. This cultural aspect is asymmetrical for males and 
females since, if a male were to have intercourse with a female from a lower caste, he need only 
cleanse himself with a ritual bath. The male does, however, retain sexual responsibility since, 
according to Hindu belief, there is a sacred quality to the man’s semen which should not be 
squandered; indeed, in such a culture, it is better to not have sexual contact with women than to 
waste one’s sperm. In the analysis of rituals and their symbolism, we must recognise such rituals 
as an attempt to create and maintain a particular culture and set of beliefs. It is exactly through 
these beliefs wherein experience is controlled: rituals manifest these beliefs and maintain social 
                                                 
34 See Stutley and Stutley, p. 160. 
35 See ibid., p. 222. 
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relations through which people get to know their own society. Ultimately, ‘rituals work upon the 
body politic through the symbolic medium of the physical body’.36 
In looking at the possibility of understanding the corporeal body as a sacred space through its 
symbolism, worship—religious or otherwise—can manifest with or through the body. Moreover, 
the body can be seen as sacred, a concept which need not adhere to religious practices. While 
avoiding a discussion of how these religious texts or symbols are in themselves viewed—in 
terms of contemporary relevance, for instance—this argument proffers the view that, through 
these rituals, artefacts and ways of devotion, the body can indeed be seen as a sacred space. My 
argument lies here: the spatiality of the body takes on sacred attributes, not necessarily excluding 
the profane, derived from cultural ritual. This points towards a symbolic mirroring of the body 
signifying a particular worldview, which can in turn reveal the ideals found in specific (possibly 
utopian) societies.  
The act of prayer, as well as meditation, takes place through certain gestures of the corporeal 
body which can be socially recognised as devotion. There are certain social conventions which 
surround both prayer and meditation, both as sacred texts as well as spaces which establish and 
maintain these gestures; moreover, within the social realm, there is a hesitance to disturb 
someone who is praying or practising meditation. On both a personal and social level, prayer and 
meditation are gestures which symbolise sacredness, which are in turn enacted by the corporeal 
body. In light of the argument surrounding utopia, one must also take into account established 
social structures which are already oriented toward utopian thought through the ideals that the 
symbols and rituals proliferate.  
 
Utopia 
Utopia is popularly seen as the attainment of an ideal or perfect society, although there is vast 
academic discussion as to what this ideal society truly is. Following this, would we be able to 
synthesise the sacred space of the body with the general concept of utopia? The acts of prayer 
and meditation may be both an individual or collective act, ones which provide an element of 
peace and hope to the person enacting it. These gestures are recognised social symbols which 
point towards the understanding of a “sublime” or an “ideal” state, and thus allow us to view the 
corporeal body as being an alternative space—one which affords a glimpse of utopia—especially 
since certain sacred rituals, such as prayer or meditation, can and are performed collectively, 
pointing towards ideal states or values of the individual and society. 
In this section, I would like to tackle what exactly is meant by the notion of “utopia”, here 
focussed through all points addressed above. Drawing upon Vincent Geoghengan’s essay 
‘Ideology and Utopia’, what is meant by these notions according to Geoghengan’s reading of 
                                                 
36 Douglas, p. 129. 
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Karl Mannheim37 and Ernst Bloch38 shall be briefly outlined, especially in terms how utopia and 
ideology are related.39 It is important to note that the underpinnings of Mannheim’s work on 
utopia and ideology largely follow Marxian and Hegelian gestures of the dialectical theory of 
history; Bloch, on the other hand, himself undertakes a Marxian critique of Mannheim’s work. In 
looking at a comparison between Bloch’s and Mannheim’s thoughts, we can begin to understand 
utopia in relation to ideology; in seeing the body as being an alternative space to utopia, we must 
also understand utopia in relation to the ideas of certain social structures and symbols.  
The title of Geoghengan’s work explicitly refers to Mannheim’s work on utopian studies, 
according to whom both ideology and utopia are forms of ‘reality transcendence’. While this 
quickly implies that both ideology and utopia are incongruent with “reality”, they are also, 
however, themselves incongruent in different ways. As Geoghengan points out: 
[I]deologies are antiquated modes of belief, products of an earlier, surpassed reality, whilst 
utopias are in advance of the current reality; ideologies are therefore transcendent by virtue of 
their orientation to the past, whilst utopias are transcendent by virtue of their orientation to the 
future.40  
According to Mannheim, ideologies are situational transcendent ideas which become the mode 
of conduct or good-intentions for individuals; though practically, he argues, the meaning of this 
behaviour is rendered distorted. Mannheim states that the relationship between utopia and the 
existing order of society is a dialectical relationship. In his view, every culture allows ideas and 
values to arise which contain concentrated, unrealised, and unfulfilled propensities of the society. 
These represent the needs of each age and burst through the limits of the social order. The cycle 
continues with the existing order giving rise to new utopias, leaving freedom of development for 
other orders of existence.41 
In Geoghenan’s illustration of Bloch’s utopia, it is revealed that Bloch does not have the same 
dual understanding of ideology and utopia, and nor does he claim their incongruence with the 
real. Bloch agrees with Mannheim regarding the distortions of ideology; Bloch claims, however, 
that the utopian is an undistorted form of thought, embodying the analytical and the aspirational, 
which Bloch refers to as docta spes, or comprehended hope; this is what Geoghengan in turn 
refers to as ‘educated hope’.42 Following this, Bloch argues that utopian traces can be found 
threaded throughout history. In The Principle of Hope, he states: 
Egyptian architecture is the aspiration to become like stone, with the crystal of death as intended 
perfection; Gothic architecture is the aspiration to become like the vine of Christ, with the tree of 
                                                 
37 See Karl Mannheim, Ideology And Utopia, trans. by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (London: K. Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co., 1954). 
38 See Ernst Bloch, The Principle Of Hope (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). 
39 Vincent Geoghengan, ‘Ideology And Utopia’, Journal Of Political Ideologies, 9(2) (2007), 123-138. 
40 ibid., p. 124. 
41 See Mannheim, pp. 175-6, 178-9. 
42 See Bloch, p. 7, and Geoghegan, p. 129.  
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life as intended perfection. And in this way the whole of art shows itself to be full of appearances 
which are driven to become symbols of perfection, to a utopianly essential end.43 
On this point, Bloch does not maintain Mannheim’s linear temporality. In his view, then, history 
contains utopian moments, and the past can therefore still hold a utopian charge in the 
contemporary world, signifying how the archaic may nonetheless retain influence on the 
contemporary. Following this, transcendence of the past is not necessarily the defining 
characteristic of ideology.44 
Geoghengan subsequently analyses the concepts of ideology and utopia in conjunction with 
religion. Bloch claims utopian traces are found to be powerful within religion, and views religion 
as the embodiment of some of the most powerful aspects of human hope. Bloch distinguishes 
between the notions of the ideological and the utopian within the religious, according to whom 
traces of utopia may be found in both the religious texts and practices—and these hold a 
contemporary significance. Religious texts are studied and noted for their ideological aspects, 
and subsequently tie the text to the dominant attitude of that time frame. The utopian elements in 
the text so point towards ‘a richer form of being’; Bloch, in fact, recognises that the great 
questions of meaning are explored through religion, and ‘that which seems at first sight furthest 
from the human— the divine—is actually the most intimate’.45 In conclusion of this brief 
analysis of Geoghengan’s reading, Bloch’s and Mannheim’s arguments, though differing greatly, 
both explore the relationship between the ideological and the utopian; furthermore, both explore 
key concepts in their function, that of hope, fear, and self-deception. 
Utopia may be understood, at the very least, as the aspirations or attainment of a richer form of 
being, of hope for humanity as made especially evident through Bloch. I do not wish to conflate 
the notion of religion as an institution with that of the sacred, and here there must also be an 
acknowledgement of some forms of sacredness as adhering to other domains of human life (as 
already discussed through Eliade). Crucially, linking the notion of utopia with the body returns 
us to the idea that bodily symbols are not private ones, but ones socially recognised and which 
generally take place within established society. The body becomes a symbol rooted in the aspect 
of a shared experience of corporeality; moreover, from the perspective of the believer, as well as 
their social context, the body may become a symbol for the sacred—a sacred act, a sacred 
gesture, even a sacred body—which contains traces of the utopic. The body which engages in 
such gestures and rituals—for example, prayer or meditation—does so in line with an established 
belief system. Though these symbols may be misinterpreted by an outsider, we must also view 
them as mirroring an established social structure, one which orients itself towards specific ideals.  
The symbols of the body—for and as the sacred—are both rooted in ideology, in the set of 
beliefs of a particular society, and allude to a striving towards hope and a higher form of being. 
This is further perpetuated by the society that manifested the bodily symbol. The point here is 
                                                 
43 Bloch, p. 65.  
44 See ibid. 
45 ibid., pp. 133-4, 136. 
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not that certain symbols of the body are utopian states, but rather that the sacred bodily symbols 
contain utopian traces rooted in ideology: 
I appeal to you, therefore, brothers, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living 
sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship [...] for as in one body we 
have many members, and the members do not have the same function, so we, though many, are 
one body in Christ.46 
In looking at such symbols in belief systems, we can view the body as being oriented towards the 
divine, but also as possessing utopian principles—the ideals of a given society. The body 
becomes simultaneously symbolic of what is beyond society as well as what is of societal value. 
The symbolic rituals reveal the values of that society and manifest through the shared human 
experience of the body; they are, to recall the words of Geoghegan, ‘educated hope’. In this way, 
the body is not only a possible alternative space for utopia, but already manifests utopian traces 
through established sacred bodily symbols. Furthermore, we can see bodily symbols of 
sacredness being influential in the contemporary as we continue to mirror the structure and 
beliefs of society—its ideals and values—through our own bodies.  
 
Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, I have viewed the body from the perspective of phenomenology in order 
to come to grips with corporeal spatiality. I have discussed the definition of the sacred at some 
length, arguing that the body can be seen as sacred through its symbolic nature. The sacred, 
stemming from the ideology of specific cultures, can then become symbolised through the 
gestures, instances, attributes, and rituals of the body. Furthermore, these symbols are ones 
socially recognised, stemming from the social paradigm itself. With reference to these symbolic 
aspects, the body may be regarded as a space that is worthy, at least to some, of devotion and 
esteem, or a medium to worship the worthy. Furthermore, to briefly apply and re-iterate 
Geoghegan, these sacred bodily symbols reflect an educated hope, rooted in ideology and which 
contain utopian traces—indeed, these sacred bodily symbols are already oriented towards and 
represent social ideals which contain traces of the utopian.  
What is the use of this in utopian studies? What insights may we gain from viewing the body 
itself as containing traces of the utopian through particular social symbols? Firstly, we may view 
utopia, or traces of it, as manifesting through the corporeal body itself. Secondly, we may be 
underestimating the powerful nature of the body and the social symbols that are perpetuated 
daily. Indeed, if the body may be both a sacred space and as striving towards the utopian, we 
may also need to continue analysing the body as the “absolute here” in relation to the religious, 
social, and political realms. 
 
                                                 
46 Romans 12. 1, 5. 
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